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1. Introduction 
 
By now, all of us know that in perceiving and recognizing everyday objects we use 
different senses combined together (multisensory process). However, vision has 
always received almost the whole attention in research fields leaving the other 
sensory modalities scarcely explored (Gallace and Spence, 2009). This probably 
because, as it is easy to imagine, we mainly explore and recognize objects by looking 
at them. However, it is also true that we can touch objects in order to acquire a whole 
series of information (shape, size, weight and more). Starting from this statement, 
researchers began to focus on haptics too. As pointed out in Lacey and Sathian’s 
review, two events were important for this direction change: from the 1980s, haptics 
started to be a stand-alone research field; moreover, from the 1990s, researchers 
became more and more interested in studying multisensory interactions instead of 
focusing on separated sensory modalities (Lacey and Sathian, 2014). 
On one side, the two sensory modalities seem to present many differences. First of 
all, haptic processing is restricted to those objects which are inside the peripersonal 
space, while vision allows to collect information also about those objects that are 
outside from the peripersonal and quite distant from the observer. Moreover, a big 
difference is that vision allows us to have an holistic perception of the scene, while 
haptics requires a sequential exploration. This means that using vision we can 
explore different objects together and receive more information about the same 
object in a short time; while using haptics, we will receive a restricted part of the 
information in a certain time and consequently more time is needed for a big amount 
of features data. Finally, categorization processes seem to be based on different 
features for the two sensory systems: shape for vision, texture for haptics (Klatzky et 
al., 2011). 
On the other side, despite the abovementioned differences, vision and haptics seem 
to draw from a shared object representation. So, unimodal different representations 
could converge in a common crossmodal object representation.   
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But, how does this process happen? Is a visual processing necessary in haptic object 
recognition? Are there other involved mechanisms?  
Then, lots of questions remain still open. Moreover, very recently a new research 
field is conquering the scene, that is about the role played by the gaze (Laeng et al., 
2014). In fact, several authors began to wonder if, since visual processing is so 
important in forming visual, and probably also haptic representations, gaze could 
have an important part in this process. 
The general target of this study is to study the role of visual processing in haptic 
object perception and representation. Moreover, the idea is to propose an answer for 
the diatribe about amodal representation/supramodal representation.  
For this reason, I will first analyze the available literature on visual, haptic and visuo-
haptic object representation and recognition; then, I will present the three 
experiments I conducted during my Ph.D. studies. 
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2. Visual object representation and 
recognition 
 
2.1. Models for visual representation  
During the years, many researchers tried to interpret how we succeed in easily and 
quickly recognize objects visually, despite the big amount of images we are exposed 
to at the same time, and the fact that these images are constantly changing in several 
features.  
Cooper et al. (1992) suggested to group the various theories about object 
representation into two categories: “metrically specific” and “metrically invariant” 
(Cooper et al., 1992). Theories categorized as “metrically specific” are those 
sustaining that we have an object representation characterized by specific features 
(size, position, orientation). Thus, when we face an object owning other specific 
features, a transformation is necessary in order to make these features consistent. 
This processes will allow the object representation activation. In this category it is 
possible to find the SCERPO model proposed by Lowe (1985) and the Feature 
Alignment Model by Ullman (1989). The SCERPO model is based on three different 
mechanisms, from which it takes its acronym: Spatial Correspondence, Evidential 
Reasoning and Perceptual Organization (Lowe, 1985). The Feature Alignment 
Model, instead, foresee two phases: in the first one, there is the creation of an 
“alignment” between the visual input and existing object models, then, the model 
that best fit with this alignment is chosen (Ullman, 1989). 
Experimental data supporting metrically specific theories are those which showed 
that participants have worse performance and longer reaction times when they are 
asked to make a same/different shape recognition tasks with objects varying in size 
(Bundesen et al., 1981; Jolicoeur & Besner, 1987) or in depth orientation (Tarr & 
Pinker, 1989; Bulthoff et al., 1991). 
In the same direction, more recently, there are studies supporting the existence of a 
viewpoint-dependence in vision (see Peissig & Tarr, 2007 for a review). Humphrey 
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& Khan (1992), for example, noticed that participants were able to better recognized 
3D novel objects when the test angle was the same as the study angle. Similar results 
were obtained by Newell and Findlay (1997) with familiar objects too.  
Theories categorized as “metrically invariant” support the idea that object 
recognition does not need a transformation to activate the existing representation, 
that is independent from the object’s specific features. In this category we find the 
Biederman's Recognition by Components (RBC), according to which objects 
representation is based on the analysis of object’s determinants and their connection 
in the space (Biederman, 1987). In particular, Biederman proposed a multistage 
model to identify an object. The first one coincides with the extraction of the object’s 
edges, then it is segmented into diverse concave regions. Now, it is possible to 
identify the object’s components, which will correspond to “geometric primitives” 
(called “geon” by the author, from “geometrical ions”). A composition of geons and 
the relation among them activate an object representation; this, in the last stage, leads 
to the object recognition. Geons are thought to be very simple geometric volumes 
(like spheres, cylinders, blocks) which are easily recognizable and almost 
independent from orientation variation and deterioration. Big importance has given 
to the type of relation among these components, since same geons can identify 
different objects on the basis of the relation existing among them (Biederman, 1987). 
Although the RBC model have not received a confirmation in real life object 
representation, some studies seem to support it. In object-naming tasks, participants 
succeeded in quickly recognizing objects which kept just few components, while 
eliminating the object’s outline including geons drove to the impossibility of 
recognizing the object (Biederman, 1987). Moreover, Biederman and Ju (1988) 
found similar performances in naming objects presented as an high-definition 
photograph or a line drawing preserving only some components (Biederman & Ju, 
1988).    
Hummel and Biederman (1992) proposed the “neural net implementation of RBC” 
(Hummel & Biederman, 1992). This model forecasts 7 levels: in the first one, cells 
react to the object image’s edges. Then, in the second level, there are groups of cells 
identifying vertices, axis and blobs. At level 3, geons’ features detection takes place. 
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This information are then used in the following two levels to understand the relation 
among geons. In the sixth level, geon features assemblies (GFAs) organize in 
patterns consisting of geons and their relation from the previous levels. Finally, in the 
last level, the object is recognized.  
A particularly interesting model, which tries to account for visual object recognition 
considering anatomical and physiological limitation, is the one proposed by 
Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999). This hierarchical feedforward model starts from the 
“simple-to-complex cells model” described by Hubel and Wiesel (1962) and expands 
it. In particular, the transition to more complex cells to conquer invariance and 
specificity proceed trough two mechanisms: “SUM”, consisting in the sum of 
afferents having similar weights (linear mechanism), and “MAX”, according to 
which response depends on the most active afferent (nonlinear mechanism). The first 
mechanism seems to bring to the features specificity. The latter mechanism, instead, 
seem to be more efficient in achieving both position  and size invariance.             
This is what Riesenhuber and Poggio hypothesize to happen in their object 
recognition model. The merit of this new proposed model, then, is to add a MAX 
mechanism to the known SUM one, and the fact that this nonlinear mechanism 
seems to receive some support from different studies (Wang et al., 1998; 
Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999) as well as being in accordance with 
neurophysiological data (Sato, 1989) with monkeys. 
According to the authors, this model can explain real-situation object recognition, 
since MAX mechanisms selectively respond to the target object without being 
distracted by other objects normally forming the scene in real life situations, and that, 
to a certain extent,  are encoded as they are in the receptive fields of the simple cells 
(Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999). 
As can be seen from the theoretical models exposed up to here, although we easily 
and quickly recognize everyday visual objects, almost without paying a particular 
attention or being so concentrated, it is not that simple to understand how this 
cognitive process takes place. That’s why different theories have been suggested 
trying to shed light on this question.  
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At the same time, it would be very interesting to know what cortical areas are 
involved in this complex cognitive process. 
2.2. Brain areas involved in visual object recognition  
After having described some theoretical models that tried to explain how the 
complex object recognition process takes place apparently effortless, it is very 
important to investigate what confirmations there are at a cortical level, and whether 
these discoveries can help us in better understanding how this process happens in a 
so effective way. 
Over the years, there have been several studies that sought to collect as many 
information as possible about visual processing. This is a broad concept that can be 
analyzed by focusing on different aspects: processing of mostly perceptual aspects 
(for example, Engel et al., 1997, for colors;  Tootel et al, 1998, for size), visual 
attention (see Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 2000 for a review) and object recognition (see 
Mazer & Gallant, 2000 for a review).  
The latter research field is the one I’m aiming to focus on.  
Many years have passed since Lashley (1948) proposed that visual processing was 
confined into the striate cortex, starting from the observation of effects caused by 
lesions in monkeys’ pre-striate areas. To date, it is now clear that this is not true. 
Rather, various cortical regions are employed in several visual processes. In 
particular, it is possible to distinguish two hierarchical visual processing streams: the 
ossipitotemporal/ventral and occipitoparietal/dorsal pathways. The first one (ventral) 
is also known as the ‘what’ stream, while the second one (dorsal) as the ‘where’ 
stream (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). This because they are supposed to be 
involved in objects recognition and localization respectively. These findings derive 
from studies on monkeys’ cortical lesions (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; Mishkin et 
al., 1983) but they also received a reply from human clinical patients (Newcombe et 
al., 1987). Moreover, thanks to the advent of new research technologies it has been 
possible to confirm the existence of the ventral and dorsal pathways in humans with 
studies using the PET technique to measure the regional cerebral blood flow (Haxby 
et al., 1991; 1993; Kohler et al., 1995; see Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994 for a review). 
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In this ventral way, studies with monkeys showed that the object recognition process 
follows a hierarchical pathway which goes from the primary visual cortex (V1) to the 
inferotemporal (IT) cortex (Tanaka, 1993). With the help of the fMRI technique, 
some authors (Sereno et al., 1995; Tootel et al, 1996) found that in humans there is  a 
retinotopical organization around the V1, which could be compared to that showed in 
monkeys V2, V3 and V4. The point is to investigate the existence in humans of an 
homologous brain area like the IT (inferotemporal cortex) in monkeys, which seems 
to be fundamental in object representation and recognition. 
Malach et al. (1995) proposed that this role is accomplished in humans by the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC), a region situated in the lateral portion of the occipital 
cortex and the post-medial area of the fusiform gyrus. Authors compared the cerebral 
activation, using fMRI, during the passive view of object and texture images. Results 
showed a greater LOC activation for object pictures than texture pictures, suggesting 
a primary role of this cortical region in object identification. The following year, 
Kanwisher et al. (1996) obtained similar results employing line drawings as input 
stimuli. In fact, is was noted a stronger LOC activation for line drawings representing 
an object form than for muddled ones. It is important to underline that these results 
are achieved with both familiar and unfamiliar objects.  
Nevertheless the “simple” activation of a selected cortical region during objects view 
is not enough to assert with certainty that it is specialized for object recognition, 
since other processes could intervene.  
Data supporting the centrality of the lateral occipital complex in object recognition 
derive from different studies. Some of them concentrated on the investigation about 
those characteristics linked to object recognition defined as “form-cue invariance” 
and “perceptual constancy”. The first refers to the capacity to identify an object 
shape independently from the visual cues forming it. The second one, perceptual 
constancy, concerns the possibility to recognize the object independently from 
changes in its size or location. Tanaka (1996) demonstrated that activation in 
macaque inferotemporal cortex (IT) is position/size and form-cue independent.        
In humans, Grill-Spector and colleagues (1998) comparing the effect of motion, 
texture and luminance contrast as visual cues, noted that all of them were 
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comparably able to lead to object identification. fMRI data showed overlapping 
activation patterns related to the three form-cues, thus supporting the LOC 
importance in object recognition. Kourtzi and Kanwisher (2000) obtained similar 
results measuring the BOLD signal for different image cues: contours, shading and 
monocular depth. Also in this case the LOC proved to be fundamental in object 
processing, independently from the different eliciting cues.  
As to perceptual constancy, Malach et al. (1995) found that changing images’ size do 
not bring to alteration in the cortical activation (LOC), rather there are overlapping 
activation maps for different stimulus sizes. Interestingly, Grill-Spector et al. (1999), 
using an alternative technique (fMRI adaptation), advanced the idea that it is possible 
to identify two subregions in the LOC: an anterior-ventral area, which shows a 
stronger adaptation together with position and size invariance than the caudal-dorsal 
area. 
Summarizing, the lateral occipital complex seems to have a primary role in object 
identification and recognition, independently of the visual cues defining objects and 
of changes in objects’ size and location. 
Further findings supporting the fundamental role of LOC in object recognition arrive 
from studies regarding patients with lesions. Damasio et al. (1990), for example, 
showed that focal lesions in the fusiform region were associated to prosopagnosia, 
that is the incapability to recognize previous familiar faces and to memorize new 
ones. Moscovitch et al. (1999), instead reported the case of a man with a LOC injury 
who was able to recognize faces but he showed an object agnosia, namely he could 
no longer succeed in object recognition. In a very interesting research, James et al. 
(2003) took into consideration a patient showing visual form agnosia, but who was at 
the same time able to process some object information in order to drive actions 
towards it. This motor capacity versus object discrimination inability resumes the 
above studied contraposition between “what-ventral” and “where-dorsal” pathways. 
Moreover, using fMRI technique, authors showed that, contrary to what have been 
previously found (Malach et al., 1995; Kanwisher et al., 1996), in the patient’s LOC 
there was no greater activation for line drawings representing clear objects than for 
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muddled line drawings, underlining the object recognition impairment. Finally, high-
resolution anatomical RMI confirmed that lesions had hit the LOC area bilaterally.  
Summing up, as to cortical regions involved in object representation and recognition, 
the LOC seems to occupy a prominent place. Different orders of studies, in fact, 
demonstrated that it plays a fundamental role in the global object form recognition, 
regardless of visual cues (form-cue invariance) and of changes in input size and 
location (perceptual constancy). Moreover, LOC impairments (clinical patients with 
cortical lesions) lead to various types of object agnosia, even while object perception 
per se remained unaffected.  
Thus, even if the processing is not entirely clear, there is the shared idea about the 
fundamental role played by the LOC in object recognition.  
2.3 The role of eyes’ movement 
In the “Scanpath Theory”, Noton and Stark (1971a) referred to the set of saccades 
and fixations that a person makes while observing a scene using the term “scanpath”. 
Authors suggested, for the first time, that the fixations patterns made while encoding 
an image and then recognizing it, are almost stackable (Noton & Stark, 1971a).  
This statement found a confirmation in studies comparing scanpaths made by 
participants exposed to more views of the same picture. For example, in a 
recognition study, Foulsham and Underwood (2008) let participants explore a set of 
45 images first. Afterwards, participants received a new group of 90 images and they 
were asked to say whether they have already previously explored them. Authors 
noted that scanpaths made during the recognition phase were more similar to the 
ones made during the learning phase for the same objects, compared to scanpaths for 
new pictures (Foulsham & Underwood, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the Scanpath Theory has often been criticized since eyes’ movement 
patterns were thought to be connected to the visual features of the scanned image 
(bottom-up control) which capture them, rather than starting from an internal stored 
sequence. 
To prevent this problem, researchers began presenting participants to their 
experiments with tasks requiring imagery (Brand & Stark, 1997; Holsanova et al., 
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1998) and blank spaces observation (Ferreira et al, 2008). Brand and Stark (1997), 
for example, found almost overlapping scanpaths produced during the exploration 
and the subsequent imagination of a chessboard diagram. Similar results have been 
obtained by Holsanova and colleagues (1998) with real life scenes. These results 
agree with the idea that the repeated scanpaths for the same image are not due to the 
stimulus presence itself, but rather to internal perceptual patterns. Further data 
supporting this statement arrives from imagery experiments performed in completely 
darkness (Johansson et al., 2006).   
To add further support to the importance of eye movements for scene encoding and 
recalling, Laeng and Teodorescu (2002), with a particular imagery task, showed that 
when participants were required to keep their eyes fixed on the center while encoding 
a scene, they tended to do the same during the imagery phase. Moreover, as a further 
confirmation, when participants were instructed to freely explore the scene during 
the encoding phase and then to fix the center during imagery, they showed an 
impaired performance. According to the authors, this could happen because it is as if 
a piece of information acquired during encoding is lacking for the mental image 
reconstruction (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). 
More recently, Laeng et al. (2014), relying on results from previous researches, 
assumed that when trying to recover a scene’s image previously experienced, not 
only eye movements take place, but these essay to reproduce the content of the initial 
scene even if it is not present anymore. In particular, to give evidence of what have 
been said, in a first experiment they asked participants to visually study an image (a 
triangle) and then to create a mental image of it while looking at a blank display. In 
another version of the same experiment, triangles were replaced by animals’ pictures. 
In both cases, results showed that during the mental image construction participants 
tended to replicate similar scanpaths as in the studying phase and, moreover, the 
fixation duration was greater in the display areas which contained peculiar features 
for pictures recognition. In a second experiment, participants were asked to 
memorize some images (animal pictures) as they would have to respond to same 
questions about them later. Results showed that when trying to recover the 
information to provide the answer, participants tended to look exactly at the display 
region in which the investigated aspect was during the memorization phase. In a 
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different experimental condition, participants were requested to fixate a point in the 
display away from the investigated region while finding the answer to the question. 
This produced worse performances than the previous experimental condition (in 
which participants could freely move their eyes).  
Whether, from one side, it could appear controversial that eye movements occur even 
when there is nothing to look at or there is nothing to be perceived, from the other 
they could have an important role. As proposed by Hebb (1968), moving eyes during 
recalling an information helps rebuilding the scene representation since during 
perception we also register the eye movements made to acquire the scene. About this, 
some authors started to sustain that imagery and perception share common 
mechanisms (Kan et al., 2003) and to join the idea of an “embodied” perception 
(Barsalou, 1999; Gibbs, 2006), that conceive the perception process as active. In this 
sense, then, also the imagery process could be considered as active, taking into 
account the body information in the recovery of internalized data. Above all with 
visual imagery, it would seem that positions and eye movements could be stored as 
integral part of the general scene representation (Noton & Stark, 1971a; Noton & 
Stark, 1971b). 
These theories received a good quantity of confirmation from different studies: 
recognition tasks, imagery tasks in different experimental conditions and 
neuroimaging studies.  
As seen before, in fact, participants’ performance was impaired when they were 
asked to keep their eyes fixed on a specific point or to move them in a different 
manner from the expected one (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Laeng et al., 2014). 
Moreover, Thomas and Lleras (2007) found that “steering” participants’ eye 
movements in a way that suits with the preferable one for the task solution enabled 
them to provide the right answer, while worse performances were achieved when 
their eye movements followed a casual pattern (Thomas & Lleras, 2007).  
As to neuroimaging studies, they also seem to support this belief, showing that at 
cortical level perception and imagery seem to elicit similar patterns of activation in 
the visual cortex. Considering this, Ganis et al. (2004) proposed that this comparable 
activation could be reflected in the fact that imagining something could claim the 
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same cognitive processes as when directly perceiving it. In particular, forming a 
mental image would lead to a scanpath retracing the image itself, even if it is not 
present in front of the imagining person. 
Thus, eye movements field study in connection with scene perception and 
representation is very intriguing and quite recent, so it needs to be fully explored. 
Moreover, given the importance they have in visual recognition and representation 
even in input absence, it would be very interesting to explore whether there could be 
some interaction with haptic/crossmodal representations. 
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3. Haptic object representation and 
recognition 
 
Haptics can be considered a relatively recent research field if compared with vision. 
The latter, in fact, has always received more attention since it was thought to be the 
main sensory modality in object recognition, while haptic exploration was less 
effective and provided only additional information about objects, not necessary for 
their identification. 
Now we know that this is not the case. In comparable conditions, in fact, we are able 
to haptically recognize objects as effectively as when using vision. Klatzky et al. 
(1985), for example, showed that participants succeeded in accurately recognize one 
hundred familiar objects within 3 seconds by using their hands only. 
Thus, it is very interesting to explore how this process takes place in order to lead to 
object representation and recognition.   
Before continuing, it is important to clarify that with the word “haptic” we refer to a 
set of information deriving from object exploration which includes tactile cutaneous 
perception and kinesthetic data (Loomis and Lederman, 1986).  
 
3.1 Exploratory procedures for haptic object 
identification 
Lederman and Klatzky (1987), in a research destined to stay in haptic exploration 
history, observed and described those which were then defined by them as 
“exploratory procedures” (EPs). Authors began wonder if when we use our hands to 
extrapolate different information about an object, we always make the same 
movement patterns or if these vary according to the information of interest. Using a 
match to sample task, Lederman and Klatzky (1987) asked blindfolded participants 
to choose among three objects the one which best paired the target object according 
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to a specific selected feature (for example texture, hardness, volume, weight). 
Performances were videotaped and then scanned frame by frame. They noticed that 
participants made similar hand movements for the same to be explored object 
feature. So, when participants freely explored objects, each target feature seemed to 
activate a specific pattern of hand movements: the exploratory procedures. 
Exploratory procedures (EPs) have been defined as follow:   
- “Lateral Motion”, short and quite fast rubbing movements from left to right 
and back, usually used to explore texture characteristics;  
- “Pressure”, a pressing or twisting movement to check if the surface modifies 
or does not react, usually associated with hardness exploration;  
- “Static Contact”, passively touch a surface, useful for temperature 
information; 
- “Unsupported Holding”, sustaining an object on the open hand and moving it 
up and down, usually implemented when trying to obtain information about 
the object weight;  
- “Enclosure”, trying to surround the object with hands in order to extrapolate 
information about its volume and general shape;  
- “Contour Following”, following the contour and borders of the object with 
the fingers or the hand, usually associated with the specific shape exploration   
For a graphical representation of the exploratory procedures described by 
Lederman and Klatzky see Lederman & Klatzky (1987). 
According to Klatzky and Lederman (1993), these exploratory procedures are 
directly involved in object recognition. This process, in fact, would consist in a series 
of stages: at each stage one or more reconcilable exploratory procedures are selected 
and performed in order to obtain knowledge about multiple object features.           
The result of this process is an object representation construction which is then 
compared to other representations that are already stored till the best match is found 
and, consequently, the object recognition occurred.  
Lederman and Klatzky (1990) specified that exploratory procedures selection 
depends also on the assigned task and its aim. Authors observed that the process 
activated when people were required to determine if an object appertained to a 
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specific category consisted in two phases: in the first one, participants chose 
“enclosure” and “unsupported holding” to explore the object feature, probably 
because these two exploratory procedures provide various general information about 
the object itself. Then, in the second phase, other EPs were selected according to the 
specific category aspects to be analyzed (Lederman & Klatzky, 1990). 
 
3.2 Studies with sighted and blind people 
As I have previously written, we mainly explore our world by the sense of sight. 
When, for different reasons (in the dark, blindness), it is not possible to use vision, 
we should rely on other sensory modalities, like audition and haptics. In object 
recognition, in particular, the latter seems to be the best candidate (Hatwell, 2003). 
So, several authors began thinking that to better understand how haptic object 
recognition works regardless of sight, it could be useful to involve blind people in 
their studies. Nevertheless, it is not as simple as it sounds. In fact, it is practically 
impossible to have a homogeneous sample of blind participants, since there are many 
differences in the modes and periods of their life in which blindness was acquired 
(Heller, 2000). A common distinction, anyway, is among “congenitally blind”, “early 
blind” and “late blind”. 
In this subchapter, comparisons among sighted and blind people are done, 
considering the exploratory procedures as previously described (Lederman & Klatzy, 
1987).  Moreover, it is important to take into consideration that Lederman and 
Klatzky (1993) found that when participants were not asked to attend on a specific 
object feature, there would be a primacy for texture when they used haptics only and, 
on the contrary, geometric qualities were privileged when they could see the object 
(Lederman & Klatzky, 1993). 
As suggested by Withagen et al. (2012), we could expect blind people to be more 
efficient in haptic object recognition than sighted ones because of their experience 
and training in this field, but, at the same time, sighted people could be facilitated in 
object recognition tasks by the visual imagery support. Moreover, several authors 
(Sadato et al., 2002; Sathian, 2005; Sathian & Stilla, 2010) showed that the occipital 
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cortex, usually activated by visual stimuli, is implicated in haptic exploration by 
blind people too, suggesting brain plasticity (I will treat this topic later).  
So, what results could be expected from sighted/blind comparison? Are there 
differences between young and adults?  
3.2.1 Development aspects in exploratory procedures: 
comparison between young and adult explorers 
Almost all exploratory procedures studies involved sighted adult participants. So 
some questions arise: Are these procedures present during infancy and childhood? 
When they develop? Are young and adult performances comparable in terms of 
accuracy and speed?  
As to sighted children, Bushnell and Boudreau (1991) observed how infants acquire 
the necessary skills to use their hands for exploring objects, in order to extract 
information about their features (size, shape, texture and so on). According to the 
authors, this process takes place during the first year. In particular, they found that 
four months old children showed movement patterns which can be associated to the 
“enclosure” EP defined by Lederman and Klatzky (1987). In the next months (4-9), 
then, “lateral motion” and “pressure” appear. Nevertheless, those movement patters, 
albeit similar to those implemented by adults with the known exploratory procedures, 
seem to have different purposes in children. More recently, Alexander et al. (2002) 
found an age effect in children facing a comparison (same/different) task. 
Participants (4-9 years old children) were asked to explore pairs of animals’ models 
(dinosaurs, sharks and whales) and to decide if they were exactly the same or not. 
Results showed that older children performed better than the younger ones, 
regardless of their level of knowledge about used stimuli. This was probably due to a 
more efficient haptic exploration strategy used by older children which led to the 
conquer of a bigger amount of details useful for comparing models and taking a 
decision on their similarity (Alexander et al., 2002). 
As to blind children, Morrongiello et al. (1994) studied how they and sighted 
children (3-8 years old) explore and recognize objects. Children were presented with 
objects changing in size in a haptic recognition task. Results revealed that older 
children were more accurate and fast than the younger ones, regardless of whether 
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they were blind or sighted.  Authors established older children to be more accurate 
and precise during exploration, focusing on specific areas besides the global object 
shape. Moreover, they suggested that sighted and blind children do not differ in their 
performances, concluding that vision is not indispensable for recognizing objects 
haptically (Morrongiello et al., 1994). Simpkins (1979) obtained similar results with 
sighted, visually impaired and blind children (4-7 years old) engaged in an object 
shape recognition. Performances (recognition accuracy and accurate hand movement 
patterns) got better with increasing age (Simpkins, 1979). Millar (1997), in general, 
supported the idea that blind children demand “convergent and redundant 
information” to reach the same level of knowledge as sighted children (Millar, 1997). 
In a recent study, Withagen et al. (2012) employed a similar procedure like 
Lederman and Klatzky (1987), but they involved in the experiments congenitally 
blind participants besides sighted ones. Moreover, half of participants were 7-13 
years old, the other half were adults. Experiments concentrated on just four object 
properties: exact shape, volume, weight and texture. Results showed that adults 
performed better than young in the matching task for all of the object properties, but 
there was no difference in response speed. As to sighted/blind comparison, authors 
noted that the only difference between the two groups was that blind adults were 
faster than blind adults in the “exact shape condition”. Withagen et al. (2012) 
concluded by stating it is likely that adults use more effective and targeted strategies 
than young; moreover, they gave two possible explanations for speed differences: it 
could be possible that sighted participants reconstruct mental image while exploring 
the object shape and this could cause a cost in terms of time, or blind participants 
hold more relevant strategies to face this task (Withagen et al., 2012). 
Summing up, all the previous results are in line with what is explained by Hatwell 
(2003): young people usually utilized general patterns of exploration which are not 
the best solution for that object property or for the task solution. Then, growing up, 
they acquire the exploratory procedures that we know to exist in adults (Hatwell, 
2003; Lederman & Klatzky, 1987).  
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3.2.2  The role of mental imagery  
Cattaneo et al. (2008) proposed an exhaustive review about this topic which I suggest 
to read and from which I will start for my discussion. 
As we have just seen, it has not been understood yet what role visual experience 
plays in haptic object recognition. In fact, we could think blind people to perform 
better in this task since they are used to rely on their hands to explore objects, so they 
are more experienced. On the other side, we could reason that sighted people are 
facilitated in object recognition tasks because they can rely on visual imagery, since 
they experienced visual processing. The connection between perception and imagery 
in vision is supported by several behavioral (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 1999a; 
Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992) and neuroimaging (Kosslyn et al., 1995; Chen et al., 
1998, Kreiman et al., 2000; Kaski, 2002) studies, even though the same authors 
suggested that comparing direct visual perception to visual imagery leads to not so 
comparable results (Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992; Kosslyn et al., 1999b;) or 
cortical activation level (O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). Chen and colleagues 
(1998), for example, tested sighted participants with two mental imagery tasks 
(“hometown walking” and “flashing light”) in the dark. fMRI data showed that both 
visual perception and imagery activated the visual cortical areas; in particular, V1 
(primary visual cortex) and the lateral geniculate nucleus were the regions involved. 
These results supported a shared brain activity for perception and imagery with 
visual stimuli. Kosslyn et al. (1999b) solicited participants first to memorize a set of 
stripes and then to compare a pair of them about a requested feature (like extent) by 
using imagery only or by seeing the stimulus image. During the test phase, two 
different techniques were used: PET and rTMS (repetitive transcranical magnetic 
stimulation) obtaining complementary results. Authors concluded, in fact, that PET 
showed the medial occipital cortex (in particular area 17) activation during both test 
conditions (visual imagery and visual perception) and rTMS data confirmed this 
statement by showing that when applied to that specific brain area this technique 
resulted in a performance decline in both test conditions (Kosslyn et al., 1999b). 
Similar results were obtained by Kreiman et al. (2000) when epileptics patients were 
asked to visualize a previously seen image. Results led authors to support a shared 
neural substrate for visual perception and mental imagery (Kreiman et al., 2000). 
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Kaski (2002), in a useful review, suggested that visual perception is necessary for 
visual imagery to take place. These results were supported also by Ganis et al. (2004) 
who, from one side, found that answering to questions about a mentally visualized or 
perceptually seen object picture activated a common neural substrate.  
Thus, considering the studies above reviewed, should we consider blind people to be 
irreparably disadvantaged?  
Fortunately, this does not seem to be the case, advancing the thought that they (and 
mental imagery in general) could lean on other mechanisms than visual processing. 
Several studies, in fact, supported that different brain areas are engaged by visual 
perception and mental imagery. Ganis et al. (2004), about that, noticed that although 
there was a comparable general activation, this was not homogeneous, with greater 
overlapping in the parietal and frontal areas rather than in occipito-temporal one. 
This would suggest that higher-order mechanisms could work with visual perception 
and mental imagery in a similar manner, while lower-order mechanisms could differ 
between them (Ganis et al., 2004). Relying on ERPs (event-related potentials) data, 
Farah (1989) suggested that visual imagery seems to engage the visual association 
cortex instead of the primary visual cortex. This result was confirmed by D’Esposito 
et al. (1997) with the help of fMRI, a more efficient technique with this type of 
information. Authors asked participant to listen to an object’s name and visualize it 
(condition 1) or just wait for the next one (condition 2). Comparing the neural 
activation during the two experimental conditions, D’Esposito et al. (1997) 
confirmed what previously suggested by Farah (1989): mental imagery do not 
directly activate the primary visual cortex, but it seems to involve the visual 
association areas (in particular area 37) (D’Esposito et al, 1997). Another 
confirmation derives from the similar results get by Knauff et al. (2000): the authors, 
again, support the idea of a mental imagery relying on higher-order visual brain 
regions, like the visual association cortex, while the primary visual cortex is not 
necessarily implicated (Knauff et al., 2000). 
Further support to these findings comes from studies involving patients with cortical 
lesions. Behrman et al. (1992), opposing to the existence of a shared representation 
for visual perception and imagery, described a patient showing agnosia, namely the 
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difficulty to recognize visually explored objects. Interestingly, mental imagery was 
preserved: he was able to solve various tasks requiring the mental creation of an 
object image. These observations led the authors to suggest that mental imagery rely 
on a different more complex representation than the visual perception per se 
(Behrman et al., 1992). In the same direction, Bartolomeo et al. (1998) reported that 
a patient with damaged temporo-occipital areas had a series of difficulties linked to 
visual perception (agnosia, alexia, achromatopsia) but an unharmed visual imagery. 
Thus, according to the authors, mental imagery and visual perception seem to recruit 
different brain regions (Bartolomeo et al., 1998). 
Important information come from the study by Chatterjee and Southwood (1995) 
with three cortical blind participants. Also in this case, it was demonstrated that 
patients were able to solve imagery tasks and the primary visual cortex was not 
implied, suggesting that visual experience and mediation is not necessary for the 
visual imagery to work and that they rely on different mechanisms and brain areas 
(Chatterjee & Southwood, 1995). 
Aleman et al. (2001) made a comparison between sighted and congenitally blind 
participants in a mental shape comparison task. Authors asked participants to 
compare three spoken shapes and to choose the one to be excluded (namely the one 
which was more different from the others). Results showed that, even though 
congenitally blind made more mistakes than sighted, the first properly succeeded in 
solving the task. Aleman and collaborators (2001) suggested that blind participants 
could rely on haptic imagery as well as sighted ones rely on visual experience, also 
concluding that a visuo-haptic shared representation exists. Noordzij et al. (2007), 
using a very similar method  like Aleman et al. (2001), compared for the first time in 
the same task, sighted, early-blind and late-blind participants. They found no 
differences between sighted and early-blind participants’ performances and, 
consequently, suggested that blind people rely on haptic imagery and this goes in the 
more and more shared idea that vision loss is compensated with the experience in 
other sensory systems (Noordzij et al., 2007).  
Further support also derives from studies indicating that brain regions always 
considered to be predominantly visual, can respond to haptically presented stimuli. 
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Pietrini et al. (2004), for example, found that recognizing common objects visually 
(sighted) or haptically (blind) engaged the same cortical areas, namely the ventral 
visual pathway. According to the authors, this result cannot be linked to the 
employment of visual imagery in haptic recognition, but rather to the existence of a 
sensory-independent representation located in the visual cortex (Pietrini et al., 2004).  
Another suggestion to explain the engagement of visual cortical areas during haptic 
processing comes from studies suggesting a functional cortical reorganization in 
blind people (D’Angiulli & Waraich, 2002), a topic that I will treat in the following 
subchapter.   
It is very interesting to say something about dreams’ content in blind people. Bertolo 
et al. (2003) and Bertolo (2005) compared sighted and blind people on dreams’ 
content drawings and alpha rhythm data. They found no differences between the two 
participants formations: blind were able to accurately draw the previous verbally 
described dream’s scene. Thus, according to the authors it is possible to state that 
congenitally blind present visual material in their dreams, even if they did not have 
any previous visual experience, and this suggests a sensory invariant visual imagery 
(Bertolo, 2005). 
3.2.3 A functional cortical reorganization  
Several studies showed that an early visual loss can be followed by a functional 
cortical reorganization in which the one representing the “visual” cortex in sighted 
people, can be employed in processing stimuli coming from different sensory 
systems than vision (Uhl et al., 1994; Amedi et al., 2003; Collignon et al., 2007).  
As to haptic/tactile stimuli, which are in my interest, different studies with the 
application of different technologies seem to get to the same result: typically 
somatosensory inputs activate visual brain regions in blind people only. Sadato et al. 
(1996), for example, measured how much visual cortex activates in early-blind 
participants compared to sighted, during a Braille discrimination task using PET 
technology. They showed that the occipital regions activated during the task only in 
blind participants. Cohen et al. (1997), instead, used the transcranical magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) in association to haptic identification tasks with sighted and early-
blind participants. Authors showed that applying the TMS to the occipital cortex 
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(implied in visual processes) affected blind participants’ performance but not the 
sighted one, who (according to the literature) would have been affected when facing 
visual tasks (Amassian et al., 1998). Cohen and collaborators, then, suggested a 
cortical reorganization in blind people, with the implication of visual brain regions in 
haptic processing (Cohen et al., 1997). Amedi et al. (2005) obtained similar results 
using fMRI: they found visual cortex activation in relation to Braille reading in 
congenitally blind participants compared to normal sighted people.  
At this point, a question arises spontaneously. Does brain plasticity occur during a 
specific developmental period of life? Some studies demonstrated that there seems to 
be a time frame in which the brain reorganization can take place (Cohen et al., 1999; 
Sadato et al., 2002; Sathian, 2005). Cohen et al. (1999), for example, compared 
congenitally blind, early-blind and late-blind participants in a Braille reading task, 
with the utilization of two techniques: PET and rTMS. PET data showed no 
activation in the occipital cortex for late-blind participants only. In the same way, 
rTMS applied to the same areas caused impairments in Braille reading in the other 
participants (congenitally- and early-blind). In the authors’ opinion, thus, there is a 
period in which this brain reorganization seems to be possible, and it stays within 12-
14 years (Cohen et al., 1999). Sadato et al. (2002), using fMRI technique, showed 
that during passive tactile Braille dots discrimination it is possible to find a greater 
activation in the visual association areas in all of the blind participants than in 
sighted ones. As to the primary visual cortex, results differ between early-blind and 
late-blind (the watershed is 16 years): authors found an activation only in the first 
group. Thus, even if there is no agreement on the specific age, it is a shared idea that 
brain plasticity presents a critical period in which it can take place. Whether, on one 
hand, this sounds like bad news for late- blind participants, on the other it could 
stimulate research to grow in the perspective of creating sensory substitution devices 
for congenitally and early-blind people.  
Summing up, according to Cattaneo et al. (2008), researches which paid their 
attention to the study of visual areas implied in haptic processing by blind people, 
using different brain activity investigation techniques, highlighted two possibilities:   
the existence of supramodal cortical regions, in which inputs are processed 
regardless of their sensory modality located in the occipito-temporal cortex; 
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otherwise, the functional cortical reorganization led visual areas to be engaged in 
haptic processing by blind when visual stimulation is not present.  
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4. Visuo-haptic object representation 
and recognition 
 
In the visuo-haptic search field, there are not so many studies investigating the  
crossmodal object representation and recognition; so the existing literature is shared 
by different authors. Very exhaustive publications concerning this topic are those by 
Lacey and Sathian (Lacey & Sathian, 2012; Lacey & Sathian, 2014). Therefore, I 
will proceed following their logical structure, but analyzing and concentrating on the 
most relevant researches that constitute the basis of my studies (crossmodal visuo-
haptic object representation).    
 
4.1 Visuo-haptic object categorization 
First of all, it is important to say something about the categorization process, since it 
seems to be the basis of good recognition processes. Nevertheless, as we already said 
in the introduction, almost all studies focused mainly on the visual system, leaving 
little space for the investigation of haptic and visuo-haptic categorization processes. 
Very recently, anyway, several authors started to be interested in studying 
similarities and differences between haptic and visual categorizations. Cooke et al. 
(2007), for example, concentrated on the importance of similarity in categorization 
processes and they wondered how this concept works when people are asked to rate 
abstract 3D items changing in shape and texture by using vision, haptics or both 
modalities together. Similarity analysis data revealed that, in all of the cases, the 
“perceptual space” seems to be comparable for the two systems (Cooke et al., 2007). 
Similar results were obtained by Gaißert and colleagues using complex shell-shaped 
stimuli (Gaißert et al., 2008) and real seashells (Gaißert & Wallraven, 2012). It is 
important to underline that the same result was obtained again when Gaißert et al. 
(2010) compared passive viewing of 2D objects to haptic exploration of 3D ones, so 
that they had similar investigation modalities for vision and haptics (Gaißert et al., 
2010). 
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However, other results from the same abovementioned authors suggest that the 
categorization process is not superimposable for vision and haptics, since objects 
features have different weights in different modalities. In particular, Cooke et al. 
(2007) found that shape was the dominant feature in visual condition, while it has a 
weight comparable to texture in haptic and bisensory conditions (Cooke et al., 2007). 
Gaißert et al. (2010), using more complex objects, noticed that only shape features 
had different weights for the two sensory modalities.  
As proposed by Lacey and Sathian in their review “these studies suggest a close 
connection between vision and haptics in terms of similarity mechanisms for 
categorization but do not necessarily imply a shared representation because of the 
differential weighting of object properties in each modality” (Lacey & Sathian, 2014, 
p. 3).  
At the same time though, recently Yildirim and Jacobs (2013) found in their 
experiments that participants were able to shift knowledge related to categorization 
across vision and haptics (Yildirim & Jacobs, 2013), suggesting that a shared 
multisensory representation could be hypothesized for crossmodal categorization. 
Thus, we do not have a final answer about this contraposition and more researches 
are needed.  
 
4.2 Cross-modal recognition asymmetry 
It is now known that people are able to visually recognize objects previously 
explored haptically and vice versa. But two questions arise: is crossmodal object 
recognition comparable to unimodal object recognition? Does crossmodal 
recognition process obtain the same results independently from which sensory 
modality comes first? According to some authors, the answer seems to be ‘no’ in 
both cases. Casey and Newell (2007), for example, using a face recognition task 
found that performances were better in within-modal recognition condition than in 
the crossmodal one, suggesting different representations for the two sensory systems 
(Casey & Newell, 2007). Similar results have been obtained by Bushnell and Baxt 
(1999) with 5 years old children (Bushnell and Baxt, 1999) showing lower accuracy 
for crossmodal recognition than the within-modal one. As to the second question, in 
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crossmodal recognition people gain better results when vision comes first, namely 
when objects are encoded visually and recognized haptically (Streri & Molina, 1994; 
Lacey & Campbell, 2006). According to Lacey and Sathian (2014), two reasons 
could explain this cross-modal asymmetry: first, information about the object shape 
could be better encoded by vision (as we saw above) than haptics so this would make 
the visual-haptic condition easier than the opposite condition. In the latter case, in 
fact, people performance could be affected by the interference of other objects 
features that seem to be more relevant for the haptic system (like roughness, 
plasticity). Second, the memory capacity and duration could vary for visually and 
haptically explored objects. About that, Bliss and Hämäläinen (2005) using a letter 
recognition and letter memory task demonstrated that tactile working memory 
appears to have a more confined and inconstant capacity than the visual one in young 
adults participants (Bliss & Hämäläinen, 2005). At the same time, about this topic, 
Woods et al. (2004) conducted a very interesting study, suggesting that haptic 
working memory (like visual working memory) could be more durable in time. In 
crossmodal object matching tasks, authors found that between the two experimental 
conditions (visul-hapic and haptic-visual) there was no difference in performances. 
Moreover, the same result was obtained by comparing performances in unimodal 
matching tasks, though general accomplishment was greater in the visual situation 
than in the haptic one (Woods et al., 2004). Congruent results were obtained by 
Pensky et al. (2008), who showed that visual and haptic information deteriorated 
basically in a similar way along 7 days. Summing up, it seems that differences in 
working memory capacity and duration alone are not sufficient to explain this cross-
modal asymmetry.   
Also neuroimaging studies provide some information about asymmetries between 
vision and haptics in crossmodal object recognition tasks. In particular, Kassuba et 
al. (2013) noticed that bilateral object-specific LOC, fusiform gyrus and intraparietal 
sulcus are more activated during the crossmodal visual-haptic condition than the 
unimodal one. According to the authors “results indicate a directional asymmetry in 
crossmodal matching of visual and haptic object features with a functional primacy 
of vision over haptics in visuo-haptic object recognition” (Kassuba et al., 2013, p. 
68). 
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4.3 The investigation of neural substrates  
At this point, it is interesting to understand what happens at the level of neural 
substrates. In 1995, Malach et al. showed their participants some pictures of objects, 
textures and interfering stimuli; using the fMRI technique authors found that a 
specific brain area, located in a region named “lateral occipital complex (LOC)”, 
selectively activated during the exploration of objects pictures (Malach et al., 1995). 
Using the same methodology, Amedi et al. (2001; 2002) confirmed these results 
using 3D stimuli and, in addition, they found that preference for objects in this area 
can be seen for both visual and haptic stimuli (see also Stilla & Sathian, 2008; Zhang 
et al., 2004). Moreover, they demonstrated an overlapping between most of 
somatosensory object-related voxel and the visual ventral pathway. Authors titled 
this area “lateral occipital tactile-visual region (LOtv)”. These conclusions seem to 
substantiate the supposition that these cortical areas could form a 
multimodal/supramodal object representation, and may thus be implicated in the 
processing of object shape information independently from the sensorial system used 
to encode the stimulus (Cattaneo et al., 2008). 
Confirmations about the importance of this area in visuo-haptic shape processing 
come from neurological case studies. Feinberg and colleagues (1986) described a 
patient with lesion in the occipital and temporal lobes to be no longer able to 
recognize objects both visually and haptically (visual-haptic agnosia), though he 
could accomplish other visual and haptic tasks (to copy a figure, 
unimodal/crossmodal match; Feinberg et al., 1986).  
Other brain areas have been studied relatively to multimodal object shape processing. 
Among these, Stilla and Sathian (2008) pointed out that the areas activated during  
bimodal (vision and haptics) shape processing were: the postcentral sulcus and parts 
(ventral, anterior and posterior) of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS). It is important to 
keep in mind that most of the cited areas were primarily found in non human 
primates, so the correspondence with the human brain remains dubious and their role 
in visual-haptic shape processing needs to be accurately explored.  
In summary, the exposed results seem to strongly suggest a visual cortical areas 
recruitment during haptic processing; anyway, it remains unclear if this leans on top-
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down processes implying visual imagery or on bottom-up processes which involve 
modality-invariant representations. 
 
4.4 Does a shared representation exist for vision and 
haptics? 
To understand whether vision and haptics share a common shape representation, it is 
important to investigate what role visual imagery could potentially play and if a 
modality-independent shared representation is plausible.      
4.4.1 What’s the role played by visual imagery? 
Reading the results of the above presented researches a question may arise. Why 
does haptic perception evoke activation of visual cortex? The easiest answer seems 
to be, as suggested by Sathian et al. (1997), that haptic processing leans on visual 
imagery. This hypothesis is sustained by studies noticing that mental imagery 
activates the lateral occipital complex (LOC) and visual associative areas. In this 
sense, De Volder et al. (2001), using the PET technique, showed that imagining 
objects shape leads to responses in occipito-temporal and visual association areas (in 
particular the Broadmann area) in both early-blind and sighted participants (De 
Volder et al., 2001). Newman et al. (2005) obtained similar results using the fMRI 
techniques during a mental evaluation task concerning material and geometrics 
properties of objects (Newman et al., 2005). Finally, participants in Zhang et al. 
(2004) experiments reported common experience of visual imagery during haptic 
shape perception (Zhang et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, Amedi et al. (2001), noticing a higher activation in occipito-temporal 
regions when people directly explore the object compared to imagery, proposed that 
visual imagery by itself cannot account for “visual” brain areas recruitment during 
haptic perception (Amedi et al., 2001). In the same direction, we find studies 
comparing sighted, early-blind and late blind participants. For example, Pietrini et al. 
(2004) using fMRI to register brain regions activation during visual (for sighted) and 
haptic (for blind) recognition tasks, found that “visual” areas were recruited even in 
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blind people. Stilla et al. (2008) obtained similar results with early-blind and late-
blind participants (see Sathian and Lacey, 2007 for a review).  
Taken together these results propose that visual imagery alone fails in explaining the 
engagement of the ventral visual pathway in haptic representation, at least 
concerning early blind people. In fact, we can’t leave out that it could hold an 
important role in sighted people, mostly if we take into consideration all studies 
referring to crossmodal brain plasticity following the sight loss (D’Angiulli & 
Waraich, 2002; Noordzij et al., 2007; Sathian & Lacey, 2007). 
As we already discussed in the previous chapter, also, mental imagery is not 
obligatorily linked to visual processing or visual experience in general (Craver-
Lemley & reeves, 1992; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Aleman et al, 2001) but  
rather the existence of a shared visuo-haptic higher order mechanism is more 
plausible (Behrman et al. 1992, Knauff et al., 2000; Ganis et al., 2004). 
4.4.2 An amodal shape representation  
Another answer to the question made in the previous subchapter, is that vision and 
haptics effectively rely on a shared representation in which the two modalities input 
converge. Lacey and Sathian (2012) “suggest the use of the term “multisensory” to 
refer to a representation that can be encoded and retrieved by multiple sensory 
systems” (Lacey & Sathian, 2012, p. 3).  
This hypothesis found bases on different researches. Peltier et al. (2007) for example, 
used discrimination visual and haptic tasks in addition to fMRI to show that, with 
haptic processing, the LOC, the IPS and the postcentral sulcus (PCS) were active; the 
first two regions responded also in visual condition. Then, authors proposed a model 
that foresee two streams: a bottom-up one going from the PCS to the IPS, and a top-
down path from the IPS and the LOC to the PCS (Peltier et al., 2007). In the same 
direction, Deshpande et al. (2008) found both a bottom-up path from the left PCS 
and right posterior insula to the right LOC and the occipital cortex, and a top-down 
path from the parietal area to the LOC (Deshpande et al., 2008).  Lucan et al. (2011) 
used high-density EEG to calculate the timing of haptic object recognition 
operations. They again confirmed that the LOC has a multisensory role in visuo-
haptic object recognition (Lucan et al., 2011). Pietrini et al. (2004), in the already 
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mentioned study, found that haptic object recognition activate a “posterior inferior 
temporal region of visual extrastriate cortex” (Pietrini et al., 2004, p. 5662)  and that 
these response patterns can be compared to the ones elicited by visual recognition 
with the identical items. 
Pulling the sums, activation of the visual regions seems to be more linked to an 
abstract representation of objects than to the brokerage of a visual mental image.  
Other demonstrations for an overlapping of visual and haptic representations come 
from studies on unimodal and crossmodal priming. Considering behavioral studies, 
Easton and coll. (Easton et al., 1997a; Easton et al., 1997b) demonstrated the 
existence of comparable effect for crossmodal and unimodal priming with verbal 
material, 2D patterns and 3D common objects. Similar results were obtained by 
Reales and Ballesteros (1999) with picture-fragment completion and object decision 
tasks. Neuroimaging studies also confirm this findings: James et al. (2002b) noticed 
that there is not any difference in the efficacy between visual (unimodal) and haptic 
(crossmodal) priming while viewing at primed and not primed object. In fact, they 
found a greater activation both for visually and hapically primed objects in visual 
regions than for not primed objects.  
4.4.3 Unimodal viewpoint-dependence vs crossmodal 
viewpoint-independence 
First of all, let’s define the terms “viewpoint-dependent” and “viewpoint-
independent/viewpoint-invariant”. We can say that a representation is viewpoint-
dependent when the object recognition is better if it comes from the same angle as 
the encoding. On the contrary, a representation is said to be viewpoint-independent 
when the object recognition is equally good regardless of whether the point of view 
from which it takes place is the same or vary from that of the encoding.   
What can we say about visual, haptic and crossmodal object representation? 
As to the visual system, several authors showed that visual object representations 
appear to be viewpoint-dependent (see Peissig & Tarr, 2007 for a review). Tarr and 
Pinker (1989), for example, taught participants to quickly name some objects from a 
specific angulation; then, they presented those objects from the same angle as 
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participants learnt them or from a different one. Results showed that reaction times 
(RTs) were significantly longer when observation’s angles did not coincide. 
Likewise, Humphrey and Khan (1992) noticed that participants were able to better 
recognized 3D novel objects when the test angle was the same as the study angle.  
As to the haptic system, this topic did not receive the same attention as in vision. 
Anyway, some authors proposed that, like for vision, also haptic object 
representations are viewpoint-dependent. In particular, Newell et al. (2001), using 
small unfamiliar 3D objects (compositions of LEGO bricks), found that participants’ 
performance in haptic object recognition is better if they can explore objects from the 
same orientation they did during the learning phase. This orientation, according to 
their results, means the back of the object in the haptic exploration, while for vision it 
usually corresponds to the front of the object. Authors argued that it is as if haptics 
allows to explore what remains hidden for vision (Newell et al., 2001). Lacey et al. 
(2007) replicated these results using a similar methodology.  
At this point, it is interesting to note that there is a resemblance conjuring vision and 
haptics: both of them present “canonical views” (Woods et al., 2008). This means 
that there are preferential “views” which participants choose for exploring the object 
and that allow to better succeed in the object recognition. By going to compare these 
canonical views, anyway, it is possible to observe that they differ in the two sensory 
systems. In fact, while in vision the best angle is when the median axis of the object 
is rotated 45 degrees with respect to the observer’s body midline (Palmer et al., 
1981), for haptic objects we have the “canonical view” when the object’s axis and 
the observer’s body midline are parallel or perpendicular (Woods et al., 2008). In the 
same direction, as we have already seen above, Newell et al. (2001) noticed that in 
haptic object recognition the preferential “view” is the back of the object while, on 
the opposite, in vision it is the frontal side of the object. 
From the displayed results, then, it would seem that vision and haptics deal with 
object representations in similar ways, but, at the same time, the processes leading to 
this could be different for the two sensory modalities.  
Therefore, what happens in crossmodal object representation? Interestingly, Lacey et 
al. (2007), using a recognition task with non-familiar objects, showed that rotating 
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objects between the study and the test phases impaired participants’ performance in 
the unimodal (visual or haptic) condition, but not in the crossmodal one (visuo-haptic 
and haptic-visual). In the same year, Ueda and Saiki (2007) obtained similar results, 
supporting a viewpoint-dependence for unimodal object representation and a 
viewpoint-independence for crossmodal object representation. Authors, anyway, 
specified that the viewpoint-dependence/independence for unimodal recognition 
depends on whether participants were/were not previously informed about the test 
modality. If they were, unimodal recognition conditions appeared to be viewpoint-
dependent (Ueda & Saiki, 2007; 2012); if they were not, as for crossmodal 
recognition condition, it was viewpoint-independent (Ueda & Saiki, 2007). Although 
this result may seem strange, Ueda and Saiki (2012) later showed that this could be 
linked to eye movements’ patterns. In fact, when participants knew they were asked 
to study an object visually and to recognize it haptically (visuo-haptic crossmodal 
condition), fixations during the study phase were more widespread and protracted 
than during the unimodal conditions. Lacey and Sathian (2014) hypothesized this 
explanation could work also for unimodal recognition when participants do not know 
which sensory modality they are going to be requested to use for the test phase. In 
this way, participants try to collect as much information as they can about the to be 
recognized object so that they will be ready to answer in both cases. 
At this point, Lacey et al. (2009b) tried to understand how unimodal viewpoint-
dependent representations transform in a crossmodal viewpoint-independent 
representation. Is it a direct process? Otherwise, does it need an intermediate 
processing? Starting from results obtained in two perceptual learning/object 
recognition experiments, the authors proposed a model in which unimodal 
viewpoint-dependent representations straight converge in a crossmodal viewpoint-
independent object representation, without the intermediate transformation of 
unimodal viewpoint-dependent object representations into viewpoint-independent 
ones. In fact, they noted that perceptual unimodal learning in one sensory modality 
lead to viewpoint-independence not only in that modality, but also in the other. 
Moreover, perceptual crossmodal learning reflected in unimodal viewpoint-
independence (Lacey et al., 2009b). Lacey and Sathian argued that these results 
could be explained by the “integration of multiple low-level, view-dependent, 
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unisensory representations into a higher-order, view-independent, multisensory 
representation” (Lacey & Sathian, 2012, p. 6). 
 
4.5 A model for visuo-haptic object representation 
Lacey and colleagues (2009a) advanced a model for visuo-haptic object shape 
representation, in which a multimodal representation is located in the LOC. This 
representation doesn’t care about the input sensory modality and can be accessed by 
two distinct pathways (top-down and bottom-up) depending on whether the 
processed object is known or novel. The top-down pathway goes from parietal and 
prefrontal areas to the LOC and it is activated by familiar objects processing, while 
the bottom-up pathway proceeds from the somatosensory cortex to the LOC and it is 
implicated by unfamiliar objects processing. Moreover, familiar object processing 
seems to use the visual imagery, while unfamiliar object processing recruits the 
spatial imagery (Lacey et al., 2009a). 
This proposed model finds its basis on the literature reported in the previous 
subchapters but, above all, on a series of studies focusing on inter-task correlation of 
activation magnitudes (Lacey et al., 2010a) and connectivity (Deshpande et al., 2010) 
related to visual object imagery and haptic shape discrimination tasks. In the imagery 
task, participants heard to two objects’ names and they were asked to say if their 
shapes were the same or not. In this way, it is sure that participants accomplish the 
visual imagery task. Then, participants faced an haptic shape discrimination task with 
known or novel objects. Results showed that object familiarity is the discriminating 
aspect. In fact, only with known objects authors registered an inter-task correlation of 
activation for the two tasks and only in this case there was an overlap of cerebral 
regions activation (connectivity analysis). Specifically, as foretold by the model 
proposed by Lacey et al. (2009a), two different pathways seemed to be activated: a 
top-down stream starting from prefrontal and parietal areas directed to the LOC for 
familiar objects, and a bottom-up stream going from the somatosensory cortex to the 
LOC for unfamiliar objects (Deshpande et al., 2010).  
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These data (Deshpande et al., 2010) were recomputed by Lacey et al. (2014) with the 
help of more updated connectivity technology in a study focusing on the role played 
by spatial/object visual imagery in relation with object familiarity. Results seemed to 
be in agreement with the model proposed above (Lacey et al., 2009a). In effect, there 
was a wider connectivity between object visual imagery and familiar haptic object 
discrimination on one side, and between spatial visual imagery and unfamiliar haptic 
object discrimination on the other (Lacey et al., 2014). This is probably due to the 
fact that novel objects need to be wholly explored in order to allow a representation 
to be formed (Lacey et al., 2009a). In this process, an important role seems to be 
played by the IPS (intraparietal sulcus), which is involved in forming an object 
representation by combining the spatial object information (bottom-up processing; 
Lacey et al., 2014).   
On the other hand, this does not seem to be the case for known/familiar objects, in 
which a less detailed exploration actives an existing representation via top-down 
processing starting from the prefrontal cortex (Lacey et al., 2009a). 
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5. Experiments 
 
The general aim of my research is to understand what role the visual processing 
plays in haptic object representation. Moreover, I will try to propose an answer for 
the diatribe about amodal representation/supramodal representation.  
In particular, it is true that several studies already supported the existence of a shared 
representation for vision and haptics, but almost none of them demonstrated its being 
by using abstract 3D objects, which cannot provide any familiar prompt and, 
furthermore, none of them brought support for an amodal or supramodal 
representation.  
 
5.1 Experiment 1 – Crossmodal Recognition 
The aim of this first experiment was to investigate if vision has a primary role in 
recognizing abstract 3D objects and if crossmodal priming has similar/different 
effects in visual and haptic object representation and recognition.  
Based on the abovementioned literature, the hypothesis is that sensory modalities 
order has different effects on recognition accuracy. In particular, visual priming will 
lead to a higher haptic object recognition than the opposite condition. 
5.1.1 Method 
Participants: 84 healthy university students (56 men and 28 women) from Lawrence 
Technological University (Southfield, Michigan), with a mean age of 20.73 years 
(range 16-34 years), voluntarily participated in this experiment in exchange of 
university credit or a small amount of money. All of them read and signed (or their 
legal guardians in the case they were minors) the informed consent. Participants 
reported normal or corrected to normal sight and touch.  
Materials and apparatus: A total of 12 white plaster sculptures were selected for 
the experiment from a broader list of abstract items created by students of a basic 
design class at Lawrence Technological University. The sculptures were selected in 
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pairs of two by similarity. We selected 4 non-classifiable shapes, 4 cube-like shapes, 
and 4 sphere-like shapes. They were fixed on wooden stands by means of a vertical 
stick, both painted black (see Figure 1 for an example). All the objects were 
unfamiliar, without any explicit meaning and function and 
hence arduous to be labeled. Six of them, defined target 
sculptures, were presented both visually and haptically during 
the experiment (Figure 2a) while the other six (defined 
distracting sculptures) were presented either haptically or 
visually  (Figure 2b).  
Sculptures were fixed with Velcro
® 
straps to a 242x14x2.5 cm 




Figure 2a. Target items 
 
 
Figure 2b. Distracting items 
 
Procedure: The recognition experiment consisted of two between-subjects 
experimental conditions: the haptic-visual condition and the visual-haptic condition. 
Half of participants participated to the haptic-visual condition in which the haptic 
Figure 1. An example of sculpture 
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exploration of the six target items was followed by the visual exploration of twelve 
items (the six items previously explored haptically plus six new items). The other 
half of participants took part in the visual-haptic condition in which the visual 
exploration of the six target  items was followed by the haptic exploration of twelve 
items (the six items previously explored visually plus six new items). 
Participants were not explicitly told that it was a recognition task at the beginning. 
For the haptic-visual condition, participants were blindfolded and guided in the 
experimental room in which six sculptures were placed on the wooden plank. They 
were guided in front of the first of the six items and their hands were positioned in 
the space immediately above it. They were then invited to slowly lower down their 
hands until reaching the item. Therefore, they were allowed to freely manipulate the 
items with two hands and with no restrictions, except picking up the objects. After 20 
seconds of exploration participants were asked to raise their hands and to wait for the 
next object. Participants rested for 2 seconds and then they were guided towards the 
next item and prompted to manipulate it. This procedure was repeated for all the six 
sculptures (Fig. 3). After tactile exploration was completed, participants left the room 
and waited for 2 minutes.   
Figure 3. A participant during the haptic exploration of the 6 target items 
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While the participant waited outside, all the 12 sculptures (the six that were just 
explored haptically plus six new ones, never presented before) were arranged on the 
wooden plank in a random order. Sculptures were covered with white plastic boxes 
to prevent their vision. The order of the twelve sculptures was randomized between 
participants. The participant was then led back into the room, and placed behind the 
first sculpture’s position on the table. The white box for just that sculpture was 
removed for 10 seconds, during which time the participant was allowed to visually 
examine the sculpture but not to touch it. The white box was then placed back over 
the sculpture, and the participant was asked to answer whether he/she had previously 
touched the sculpture during the haptic block. Once the answer was provided, the 
participant was led to the next sculpture’s box and the process repeated for each of 
the remaining 11 sculptures.  
For the visual-haptic sequence the sensory modalities were reversed. Participants 
first explored visually each of the six target items for 10 seconds. Then they were 
guided outside the experimental room for 2 minutes, the time experimenters needed 
to add the other six items and randomize all twelve items’ positions. Participants 
wore a blindfold before entering the experimental room for the second time. They 
explored each item haptically for 20 seconds and asked to say if they saw it in the 
previous (visual) block.  
The two experimental conditions were randomized among participants. 
5.1.2 Analysis 
At first I ran an ANOVA analysis with Modality Order (haptic-visual vs. visual-
haptic) as between-subjects factor and Accuracy as the dependent variable to test the 
different level of recognition accuracy for the two sensory modality sequences. 
Then, signal detection theory (SDT) was calculated for the accuracy data to evaluate 
the sensitivity (d') and the presence of a response bias (criterion). To test the 
sensitivity and response bias of participants in the recognition task, I ran two 
ANOVA analyses with Modality Order (tactile-visual vs. visual-tactile) as between-
subjects factor and d' and Criterion as the dependent variables.  
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5.1.3 Results 
Accuracy for cross-modal recognition was influenced by the order in which the two 
sensory modalities were presented. Specifically, the accuracy was 64.6% for haptic-
visual order and 72.6% for visual-haptic order. Analyses showed that accuracy for 
visual-haptic sequence is significantly higher than accuracy for haptic-visual 
sequence, F(1, 82) = 5.65, p = .020, p
2




Two single sample t-test were conducted to determine if d' and Criterion values were 
significantly different from zero. Results show that the d' values for the touch-to-
vision sequence (M = 1.37, SD = 0.28) and for the vision-to-touch sequence (M = 
2.08, SD = 1.92) are significantly different from zero, indicating that participants 
perform above chance level in both sequences [t(41) = 4.82, p < 0.001 for touch-to-
vision sequence and t(41) = 7.04, p < .001 for vision-to-touch sequence]. The 
Criterion values for the touch-to-vision sequence (M = -0.06, SD = 0.17) and for the 
vision-to-touch sequence (M = 0.26 SD = 0.97) are not statistically different from 
zero, indicating that there is no response bias. 
Concerning cross-modal recognition sensitivity, results show no significant effects 
for Modality Order, F(1, 82) = 3.02, p = .086, p
2
 = .035 indicating apparently that 
recognition sensitivity is not influenced by the order in which semsory modalities are 
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For criterion too, results show no significant effects for Modality Order, F(1, 82) = 
2.00, p = .161. This suggests that response approach (liberal vs. conservative) was 
not influenced by the sensory modality order. 
5.1.4 Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to investigate if vision has a primary role in 
recognizing abstract 3D objects and if crossmodal priming has similar/different 
effects in visual and haptic object recognition. 
First of all, it is important to underline that this is one of the few studies in this 
research field that involves the use of novel 3D objects. In fact, in previous 
behavioural studies participants faced with 2D objects (Lederman et al., 1990; 
Prather et al., 2004), familiar objects (Craddock & Lawson, 2008; Easton et al., 
1997a; Lacey & Campbell, 2006; Reales & Ballesteros, 1999) or very small objects 
which could be held in one hand (Newell et al., 2001; Lacey et al., 2007). 
I asked participants to tell already explored objects from new ones, using different 
sensory modalities (vision or haptics) during the two phases (encoding and 
recognition). My hypothesis was that the sensory modalities order of presentation 
would have had different effect on recognition accuracy level. In particular, I 
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Concerning cross-modal recognition, I found that participants are accurate in 
distinguishing objects previously explored through another sensory modality from 
objects that were not explored before.  
If I consider the mere accuracy, the recognition performance seems to be dependent 
from the sensory modality in which the comparison is made. In particular, visual 
objects encoding seems to lead to a higher haptic recognition level than the reverse 
(haptic encoding and visual recognition), suggesting a visual primacy in object 
representation. If I consider the sensitivity as index of recognition, that is a more 
accurate measurement with this kind of data because it takes into account the 
participants’ tendency to answer “yes” or “no”, although the result does not get to 
significance, it clearly expresses a trend in supporting a facilitating effect in haptic 
recognition when vision comes first. These results support those obtained by 
different authors (Streri & Molina, 1994; Lacey & Campbell, 2006). 
Different suggestions may be proposed to explain these results. First of all, the way 
in which the two sensory modalities takes us to acquire information about the object 
could have a primary role. In fact, vision allows us to have an holistic/simultaneous 
perception of the object which could facilitate a subsequent sequential (haptic) 
recognition while, on the contrary, starting with a sequential encoding we have a 
series of “successive impressions” (Gibson, 1962) which could have a cost in visual 
recognition.  
Another explanation comes from researches on visual and haptic categorization 
processes: they showed, in fact, that the two sensory modalities weight the object’s 
features in different ways. Thus, when we look at the object we firstly concentrate on 
its shape, while when we touch the object other properties, like texture, capture our 
attention (Cooke et al., 2007; Gaißert et al., 2010; Gaißert & Wallraven, 2012). Also 
in this case, hence, exploring the object visually could have facilitated its shape 
recognition.   
In the end, as suggested by several authors (De Volder et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 
2004; Newman et al., 2005) visual imagery could play a leading role in haptic 
recognition.  
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It is necessary to underline that I didn’t ask participants explicitly that they were 
going to face a recognition task, I just told them about this at the end of the encoding 
phase. So, it would be interesting to see if results change by expressly requesting 
participants to memorize items during encoding because they will be ask to 
recognize them later. 
Concluding, according to results from my study and previous literature, vision seems 
to have a very important (probably primary) role in haptic recognition.  
Considering that, it would be newsworthy to study if gaze patterns play some role in 
haptic object recognition (like for visual perception, imagination and recognition).    
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5.2 Experiment 2 – Unimodal (haptic) Recognition 
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate how the visual system influence 
unimodal haptic object recognition. In particular, I was wondering if gaze patterns 
play some role in haptic object recognition. 
My hypotheses are that haptic object recognition implies general visual processing 
and that, in particular, manipulating gaze patterns during encoding affects haptic 
object recognition. 
5.2.1 Method 
Participants: 72 healthy university students (44 men and 28 women) from Lawrence 
Technological University (Southfield, Michigan), with a mean age of 23.9 years 
(range 18-42 years), voluntarily participated in this experiment in exchange of 
university credit or a small amount of money. All of them read and signed the 
informed consent. Participants referred normal or corrected to normal sight and 
touch.  
Materials and apparatus: Similar materials and apparatus like Experiment 1 were 
used. The above described 12 plaster structures were utilized also for this 
experiment. The table was covered by a black curtain to prevent participants from 
seeing the wooden plank and the items fixed on it. Moreover, the table was leaning 
against a wall and at participants’ eyes height there was a wooden desk with a laptop 
on it. On the laptop screen, three out of four different experimental conditions were 
shown. For the fourth condition a blindfold was used.  
Procedure: The experiment consisted of four between-subject conditions, the 
“Screen Color” condition, the “Fixed Cross” condition, the “Moving Cross” 
condition and the “Blindfolded” condition. Each participant took part in one of the 
conditions (18 participants – 11m and 7f - for each of the four conditions).  
During the encoding phase, participants were asked to haptically explore six objects, 
tucking their hands under the curtain, for 20 seconds each, trying to memorize their 
shape for the successive recognition among twelve objects. They were allowed to 
freely manipulate the items with two hands and with no restrictions, except picking 
up the objects. After 20 seconds of exploration participants were asked to raise their 
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hands and to wait for the next object. This procedure was repeated for all the six 
sculptures. After haptic exploration was completed, participants left the room and 
waited for 2 minutes.   
This process of encoding could take place in four different conditions. While 
exploring items with both hands, participants were asked to: 
 Freely look at the laptop screen which changed color at different time 
intervals and to say “change” when the color changes  “Screen Color” 
condition 
 Fix a cross on the center of the screen and to say “change” when its color 
changes  “Fixed Cross” condition 
 Follow a cross on the screen with their eyes and to say “change” when its 
color changes  “Moving Cross” condition 
 Keep the blindfold on  “Blindfolded” condition 




While the participant waited outside, all the 12 sculptures (the six that were just 
explored – target - plus six new ones – distracters – never presented before) were 
arranged on the wooden plank in a random order. The twelve sculptures order was 
randomized between participants. The participant was then led back into the room, 
and placed in front of the first sculpture’s position on the table.  
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The recognition phase was the same for all participants. Participants haptically 
explored the first object under the curtain for the time they needed to provide an 
answer. They were asked to say “yes” if the object was one of the six touched before, 
“no” if they thought it was a new one. Once the answer was provided, they were led 
to the next item and the process repeated for each of the remaining 11 sculptures.  
5.2.2 Analysis 
At first I ran an ANOVA analysis with Condition (namely the experimental 
conditions: “Screen Color”, “Fixed Cross”, “Moving Cross” and “Blindfolded”) as 
between-subjects factor and Accuracy as the dependent variable to test the different 
level of recognition accuracy for the four experimental conditions. 
Then, signal detection theory (SDT) was applied to the accuracy data to calculate 
sensitivity (i.e. d') and the presence of a response bias (i.e. criterion). D-prime and 
Criterion were calculated as reported in the previous experiment. To test the 
sensitivity and response bias of participants in the recognition task, I ran two 
ANOVA analyses with Condition as between-subjects factor and d' and Criterion as 
the dependent variables.  
When necessary, Tukey HSD method was used for post-hoc analyses.  
5.2.3 Results 
Results show a significant effect for the factor “Condition”, F(3, 68) = 7.71, p < 
.001, p
2
 = .254. Post-hoc analyses indicated that accuracy for “Screen Color” 
condition (82.8%) was significantly higher than “Moving Cross” condition (66.2%; p 
< .001) and “Blindfolded” condition (72.2%; p < .05 ). Moreover, accuracy for 
“Fixed Cross” condition (78.2%) is significantly higher than accuracy for “Moving 
Cross” condition (p < .01).  
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Two single sample t-test were conducted to determine if d' and Criterion values were 
significantly different from zero. Results show that the d' values (M = 1.99, SD = 
1.93) are significantly different from zero, indicating that participants perform above 
chance level [t(71) = 8.71, p < .000]. The Criterion values (M = 0.11, SD = 0.74) are 
not statistically different from zero, indicating that there is no response bias.  
Concerning recognition sensitivity (SDT), results show a significant effect for 
Condition, F(3, 68) = 4.34, p = .007. Post-hoc analyses pointed that sensitivity for 
“Screen Color” condition (2.96) was significantly higher than “Moving Cross” 
condition (1.25; p < .05) and “Blindfolded” condition (1.25; p < .05) (See Table 1). 
For criterion, results show no significant effects for Modality, F(3, 68) =.16, p > .05. 
This suggests that response approach (liberal vs. conservative) was not influenced by 























Note: *= p < .05; **= p < .001 
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Table 1 
Haptic Sensitivity for Different Experimental Conditions 


























SC  .022* .754 .022* 
MC .022*  .214 1.00 
FC .754 .214  .215 
BF .022* 1.00 .215  
Note: *= p < .05 
 
5.2.4 Discussion  
The goal of this study was to understand how the visual system influence unimodal 
haptic object recognition. In particular, I was wondering if manipulating the natural 
gaze patterns during haptic object encoding would lead to different accuracy in 
recognition. 
First of all, it is important to underline that this is the first study (in my knowledge) 
trying to investigate the role of gaze patterns in haptic perception, and it’s one of the 
few studies in this research field that involves the use of novel 3D objects. 
I asked participants to tell already explored objects from new ones using haptics both 
for encoding and recognition. My hypothesis was that haptic object encoding and 
recognition imply a visual processing and that for this process also gaze patterns are 
engaged.   
Disrupting gaze patterns during haptic encoding resulted in a significant lower object 
recognition accuracy. In fact, when asked to follow a stimulus with their eyes during 
the encoding phase, participants were then less accurate in recognizing objects. 
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Analogous results were obtained when participants wore a blindfold during haptic 
object encoding.  
For the first case, a possible explanation might be that disrupting free gaze patterns 
during object encoding could prevent subjects from forming a mental image of object 
in memory. Consideration about “mental imagery” when we deal with studies 
concerning recognition and memory are very important. Recognition, in fact, occurs 
when an object perception corresponds to a representation stored in memory 
(Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992). These results would be in line with several studies 
demonstrating that, in visual representation, we not only store the contents of a scene 
but also the gaze patterns we made to explore it (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; 
Johansson et al., 2006; Humphrey & Underwood, 2008). Eye movements during 
visual exploration obviously take part in scene encoding and we are facilitated in 
recovering it from memory by reproducing those movements. Could this be the case 
for haptic exploration also? 
The most particular (unexpected) result for me is the difference between “Screen 
Color” and “Blindfolded” conditions, namely people perform worse when they are 
blindfolded than when they are asked to look at a laptop display and to say when its 
color changes during haptic object encoding. Perhaps because a frame of reference is 
missing? Or blindfolded participants don’t have a strategy to follow? An answer 
comes from studies comparing non-informative vision (i.e., visual information that is 
not linked with the investigated one)  and no vision (blindfolded) conditions.  
In particular, Newport et al. (2002) supported that in circumstances favoring extrinsic 
(visual) coordinates, providing non-informative visual information significantly 
increases the accuracy of haptic perception. Providing non-informative vision may 
elicit the default use of an external reference frame to represent tactile stimuli. 
Moreover, spatial attention may be a component of non-informative vision as defined 
by the authors. 
At this point, it would be interesting to pay attention to the kind of gaze patterns 
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5.3 Experiment 3 – Eyetracking Data 
The third experiment arises from the exploratory idea and with the general aim of 
investigating if there are differences in the gaze performances for the six target items 
used in the previous experiment. In particular, I wanted to understand if some items 
are better recognized than others and if gaze patterns are different for the best and the 
worst recognized stimuli. 
5.3.1 Method 
Participants: 12 healthy participants (7 men and 5 women) with a mean age of 28.2 
years (range 23-32 years), volunteered to participate in this experiment. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. All of them reported normal or corrected 
to normal sight.  
Materials and apparatus: Material was constituted by 18 images, obtained from 
three pictures for each of the six target items used in the previous two experiments 
(3x6), from three view angles (0°, 90°, 270°). These three angles were chosen 
because in the previous experiment participants were allowed to haptically explore 
items without any restriction, except picking them up. Gaze patterns (scanpaths) 
were registered with a SMI Eye Tracker RED500.  
Procedure: The setup included a double monitor setup: one monitor for the operator 
and a second monitor to present the visual stimuli to participants. Participants entered 
the experimental room and seated in 
front of the Stimulus Monitor in 
order to read instructions.   
They were asked to visually explore 
the pictures of 6 abstract sculptures 
from three view angles and to try 
memorizing them. After making me 
sure that instructions were clear, we proceeded with the calibration, in order to adjust 
the software to the participant's eye characteristics. Participants looked at each 
sculpture’s pictures for 10s (4s for 0°, 3s for 90° and 270°). At the end, I asked them 
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a brief description for each of the 6 sculptures they saw and remembered, just to 
verify they attentively looked at the items and to let them carry out a task.   
5.3.2 Analysis 
At first I ran an ANOVA analysis with Item (namely the 6 target items from the 
previous experiment) as within-subjects factor and Accuracy as the dependent 
variable to test the different level of recognition accuracy for the six target items. 
Then, pairwise comparisons using paired t-tests (post-hoc analysis) were calculated 
to observe the differences between couples of items. Bonferroni was used as p value 
adjustment method.  
Eye tracking data were calculated (number of fixations and saccades, fixation 
duration average, fixation dispersion average, saccade duration average and scanpath 
length) and compared for the 6 items. Then, heat map data views (attention map, in  
which different colors reveal the areas receiving more attention, being red the most, 
then yellow, green and blue) were created. 
5.3.3 Results 
Results show no significant effect for the factor “Item”, F(5,426) = 0.43, p > .05. 
Actually, this analysis was run for the previous experiment, demonstrating that there 
is not any difference in item recognition, so all results can be related to the different 
experimental conditions.  
However, I decided to proceed with the pairwise comparisons aiming to point out if 
some items were recognized better than others, albeit not significantly.  
As we can see in Table 2, there is only one item (item 2A) that seems to be 
recognized worse than the others, while all the other items seem approximately 
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Table 2 
Pairwise comparisons using paired t-tests 
 ITEM 1A ITEM 2A ITEM 3A ITEM 4A ITEM 5A ITEM 6A 
 (0.67) (0.57) (0.76) (0.75) (0.75) (0.79) 
 p-values 
ITEM 1A - 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ITEM 2A 1.00 - 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.13 
ITEM 3A 1.00 0.33 - 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ITEM 4A 1.00 0.28  - 1.00 1.00 
ITEM 5A 1.00 0.34 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
ITEM 6A 1.00 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 
 
As to eye tracking data, all dimensions (the number of fixations and saccades, the 
fixation duration average, the fixation dispersion average, the saccade duration 
average and the scanpath length) resulted to be almost the same for all of the 6 items.  
The heat maps, instead, seem to show interesting suggestions (Figure 4). For almost 
all of the items, it seems that participants concentrate their attention on specific areas 
(red spots) when they study the objects trying to memorize them. For item 2A instead 
(and in a sense for item 6 too), an area not well identified seems to capture 
participants’ attention. 
5.3.4 Discussion  
The goal of this study was to investigate if there are differences in the gaze 
performances for the six target items used in the previous experiment. In particular, I 
was wondering if gaze patterns are different for the best and the worst recognized 
stimuli. 
As shown by the recognition accuracy for the six items, it seems that they are equally 
recognized by participants. This is a good point for the two previous experiments, 
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namely there are not items that could be memorized and recognized more easily than 
others, so results obtained can be addressed to participants’ performances in the 
experimental conditions. Anyway, comparisons among couples of items indicated 
that item 2A is worse recognized than the others. 
As to eye tracking data, the different dimensions calculated for the six items (number 
of fixations and saccades, fixation duration average, fixation dispersion average, 
saccade duration average and scanpath length) resulted to be almost the same. These 
results could be considered in line with haptic recognition, which did not show 
differences among items. 
If we look at heat maps, however, we notice that when asked to memorize objects, 
participants concentrate their attention on specific areas/elements of the items. This 
is probably due to the fact that participants try to memorize peculiar elements for  
object recognition, besides the fact that they know they have very few seconds for 
storing information about the object. For item 2A this does not seem to be the case: it 
looks like participants try to explore all the object in search of a particular feature. 
Might we try to build a bridge between visual and haptic exploration? For a response, 
it would be useful to compare these eye tracking data with visual recognition data of 
items.    
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Figure 4. Heat maps for the 6 target items 
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6. General discussions and Conclusions 
 
The main goal of the present research was to inquire into the role of visual 
processing in haptic object perception and representation, using 3D abstract not 
labelable sculptures. Moreover, the idea was to try to propose an answer for the 
diatribe seeing opposing consideration about the existence of an amodal or 
supramodal object representation for visual and haptic systems. In fact, although it is 
true that several studies already supported the existence of a shared representation for 
vision and haptics, almost none of them demonstrated its being by using abstract 3D 
objects, which cannot provide any familiar prompt and, furthermore, all of them 
brought opposing supports for the representation mode.  
To this end, I first analyzed the literature about how visual objects and haptic objects 
are represented and recognized, then I reviewed studies on crossmodal (visual-haptic 
and haptic-visual) objects perception and recognition. Relying on the cited literature, 
I carried out three experiments. As to the first one, the general purpose was to 
investigate if vision has a primary role in recognizing abstract 3D objects and if 
crossmodal priming has similar/different effects in visual and haptic object 
recognition. Based on available literature, the hypothesis was that visual priming 
would have led to a better haptic object recognition than the opposite condition 
(sensory modalities reversed). Results seem to support this hypothesis, claiming a 
cross-modal recognition asymmetry for vision and haptics, relying primarily on the 
visual modality, as already demonstrated by behavioral (Streri & Molina, 1994; 
Lacey & Campbell, 2006) and neuroimaging (Kassuba et al., 2013) studies. I have 
argued proposing different suggestions to explain these results. First of all, the way 
in which the two modalities acquire information about the object could have a 
primary role. In fact, vision allows us to have a holistic/simultaneous perception of 
the object which could facilitate a subsequent sequential (haptic) recognition, while 
starting with a sequential encoding could have a cost in simultaneous (visual) 
recognition. Another suggestion is the one supported by studies about categorization 
processes (Cooke et al., 2007; Gaißert et al., 2010) suggesting the idea that the 
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information about the shape is primarily important for the visual system but not for 
the haptic one which, instead, privileges the information about object texture (Cooke 
et al., 2007). In the end, I could suggest that visual imagery plays an important role 
in haptic recognition. According with several authors, indeed, visual imagery is 
fundamental in haptic object processing (Sathian et al., 1997; Zhang et al., 2004). 
This hypothesis is based on the observed LOC activation during visual imagery tasks 
with both sighted and blind people (De Volder et al., 2001; Newman et al., 2005).  
Considering results from this studies and previous literature, then, vision seems to 
have a very important (probably primary) role in haptic recognition.  
With the second experiment (unimodal haptic recognition), I aimed to investigate 
how the visual system influence unimodal haptic object recognition. In particular, it 
would be newsworthy to see if gaze patterns play some role in haptic object 
recognition, like for visual perception, imagination and recognition. My hypothesis 
was that manipulating the natural gaze patterns during haptic object encoding would 
affect accuracy in recognition. In fact, results from this second experiment showed 
that participants were less accurate in recognizing objects when gaze patterns were 
disrupted. A suggested explanation might be that disrupting free gaze patterns during 
object encoding could prevent participants from forming a mental image of the 
object in memory. Consideration about “mental imagery” when we deal with studies 
concerning recognition and memory are very important. Recognition, in fact, occurs 
when an object perception corresponds to a representation stored in memory 
(Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992). These results seem to be in line with several studies 
demonstrating that, in visual representation, we not only store the contents of a scene 
but also the gaze patterns we made to explore it (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; 
Johansson et al., 2006; Humphrey & Underwood, 2008). Eye movements during 
visual exploration assist the scene encoding and reproducing those same eye 
movements at a later time can promote its remembrance. Could this be the case for 
haptic exploration also?  
Analogous results were obtained when participants wore a blindfold during haptic 
object encoding. This could be a surprising result, but trying to imagine why, it might 
be suggested that a frame of reference is missing in this case or blindfolded 
participants don’t have a strategy to follow. An answer comes from studies (Newport 
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et al., 2002) comparing non-informative vision with no-vision (blindfolded) 
conditions, which supports that providing non-informative visual information 
significantly increases the accuracy of haptic perception. Maybe because providing 
non-informative vision may elicit the default use of an external reference frame to 
represent tactile stimuli and, furthermore, spatial attention may be a component of 
non-informative vision (as defined by authors).  
It is important to underline that this is the first study (to my knowledge) approaching 
the investigation of the role of gaze patterns in haptic perception, and that 
performance differences in different conditions can open new search paths about the 
mechanisms engaged in haptic perception and recognition. 
At this point, it was interesting to observe the kind of gaze patterns participants do 
for exploring the target items used for these experiments, and this became the 
purpose of the third experiment. Moreover, I was wondering if gaze patterns are 
different for the best and the worst recognized stimuli. However, the six items seem 
to be equally recognized by participants and, in a sense, this could be reflected by 
eye tracking data, showing no differences among the calculated parameters (number 
of fixations and saccades, fixation duration average, fixation dispersion average, 
saccade duration average and scanpath length). Anyway, comparisons between item 
pairs indicated that as to haptic recognition item 2A is worse recognized than the 
others, so I tried to see if something analogous happens with eye tracking data. Heat 
maps showed that when asked to memorize objects, participants concentrate their 
attention on specific areas/elements of the items. For item 2A this does not seem to 
be the case: it looks like participants try to explore all the object in search of a 
particular feature. For a better exploration, it would be useful to compare these eye 
tracking data with visual recognition task data for items.    
To conclude, taken together these results offer interesting insights into how we 
represent and recognize haptic object and how this is accompanied by concurrent 
visual processing mechanisms. In fact, although there is agreement on a shared 
representation for visuo-haptic object, it is not clear yet if the two sensory modalities 
are equally weighted and if the shared representation is amodal or supramodal. 
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Results obtained with this research seem to suggest an initially modal representation 
for haptic and visual systems, predominantly based on vision (for sighted 
individuals), then converging in a supramodal representation, where vision and 
haptics share object- information and influence each other. A possible mechanism for 
this, as already proposed by Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999) for visual object 
recognition, is the integration of various unimodal representations into a higher-order 
supramodal representation.  
This is supported by several studies, like those showing a contraposition in object 
recognition between unimodal viewpoint-dependence from one side, and crossmodal 
viewpoint-independence from the other (Lacey et al., 2007; Ueda & Saiki, 2007). 
This result would suggest the existence of a different supramodal representation 
(Newell et al., 2005) involved in the processing of object shape information 
independently from the sensorial system encoding the information (Cattaneo et al., 
2008). As to brain regions convoked by this possible higher-order representations, 
many authors indicated that the later occipital complex (LOC) seems to be activated 
by both visual and haptic stimuli basically in the same way (Amedi et al., 2001; 
Amedi et al., 2002; Prather et al. 2004).   
Lacey et al. (2009a) collected all these results and other in the proposal of a model 
which describes visuo-haptic object representation. According to the authors, the 
multimodal representation is located in the LOC. This representation doesn’t care 
about the input sensory modality and can be accessed by two different pathways 
(top-down and bottom-up) depending on whether the processed object is known or 
novel. The top-down pathway goes from prefrontal and parietal areas to the LOC and 
it is activated by familiar objects processing using object visual imagery, while the 
bottom-up pathway proceeds from the somatosensory cortex to the LOC and it is 
implicated by unfamiliar objects processing using spatial visual imagery (and the 
IPS; Lacey et al., 2009a). 
Taken together, these results reflect the more and more shared idea of the existence 
of a supramodal brain instead of a unimodal inputs combination.  
  
 
- 60 - 
7. Future Directions 
 
The results obtained from this research lead to some ideas and proposals for future 
studies.  
As to crossmodal object recognition, it would be interesting to see what happen if we 
explicitly inform participants that they are going to face a recognition task.  
As to the role played by gaze patterns in haptic recognition, it would be interesting to 
know: 
- what kind of eye movements participants do during real object encoding and 
recognition  
- if there are different gaze patterns for different sensory priming 
- what results we would obtain by interfering with the recognition phase  
In the end, for a complete view, it would be interesting to repeat these studies 
associating neuroimaging techniques.  
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